The paper from researchers at Royal Holloway demonstrates the necessity for key update. The paper using the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (implemented by a whole range of organisations) to show that the more data that is transmitted using a given key the higher the probability of a successful attack on the confidentiality afforded by AES-CGM.
Showing posts with label TLS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TLS. Show all posts
Wednesday, 9 March 2016
Understanding The Limits On Authenticated Encryption In TLS
Attacks on even the latest version (version 1.2) of Transport Layer Security (TLS) have had considerable press recently with the publication of the DROWN attack which uses the legacy SSL v2 as the attack vector. Proof that mistakes of the past can haunt the present. So, as discussion at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) group working on TLS 1.3 continue a very timely paper has emerged adding some very important technical detail on the issue of "key update" in the draft specification.
The paper from researchers at Royal Holloway demonstrates the necessity for key update. The paper using the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (implemented by a whole range of organisations) to show that the more data that is transmitted using a given key the higher the probability of a successful attack on the confidentiality afforded by AES-CGM.
The paper from researchers at Royal Holloway demonstrates the necessity for key update. The paper using the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (implemented by a whole range of organisations) to show that the more data that is transmitted using a given key the higher the probability of a successful attack on the confidentiality afforded by AES-CGM.
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